This paper investigates the consequences of skill loss as a result of unemployment in an efficiency wage model with turnover costs and on-the-job search. Firms are unable to differentiate wages and therefore prefer to hire employed searchers or unemployed workers who have not lost human capital. It is shown that if some fundamental factor in the economy changes, this will result in a lengthy adjustment process with substantial long-run unemployment effects. Moreover, the model is capable of generating persistence, but the amount depends on the duration of the shock itself.
INTRODUCTION
Most European countries suffer from a chronically high unemployment rate. In major continental economies, such as Germany and France, around 10 per cent of the labor force is unemployed. Moreover, almost half are classified as long-term unemployed; i.e. they have been unemployed for 12 months or more. Another fact is that shocks seem to have effects on employment long after the shocks themselves have disappeared. For some reason, it seems to take considerable time for European economies to return to their equilibrium employment levels following a shock. This makes it important to try to understand how shocks, both temporary and permanent, affect the employment level.
One potential explanation of both the high level of unemployment and its persistent behavior following a shock is that the duration structure of unemployment somehow plays a role. Many authors have argued that longterm unemployed workers do not compete well with other searchers for the available jobs because they have lost the abilities that employers find attractive, etc. It is then argued that this duration dependence, through some mechanism, affects the wage setting in the economy, and thus puts upward pressure on wages. 1 One important paper that tries to formalize these ideas is that of Blanchard and Diamond (1994) . They examine the effect of the composition of unemployment on wage determination in a matching model. They assume that a firm that receives multiple job applications always picks the applicant with the shortest unemployment spell, a strategy they call ranking. The wage is determined by Nash bargaining with the expected utility of a recently laid-off worker as the threat point. Their main conclusion is that ranking affects the dynamics, but has only minor long-term effects.
In this paper, the consequences of skill loss as a result of unemployment are studied further by analyzing a new mechanism through which the duration structure of unemployment affects the wage setting. This is done by adapting the efficiency wage model with turnover costs and on-the-job search developed in the study by Eriksson and Gottfries (2005) to a situation with two different types of unemployed workers: one group that is identical to employed workers and one group that is less attractive to hire. 2 There are a number of reasons why a person who is unemployed for some time might lose some of his human capital. Inability to keep up with technological advances, loss of social skills and loss of motivation can make it less attractive for employers to hire unemployed workers. These factors should be particularly relevant for those who have been unemployed for a long time. At the same time, it is hardly likely that all workers suffer a loss of human capital after a specific duration of unemployment (e.g. 12 months), but rather that the timing differs between individual workers. Some workers lose skills rapidly, while others maintain them for a long period of time. To capture these facts, the model contains two stocks of unemployed workers called short-term unemployed (STU) and long-term unemployed (LTU), where workers in the second group have suffered a loss of human capital. Every STU worker faces a constant risk of becoming LTU every period.
If wages were perfectly flexible, firms should be indifferent among all job applicants, as the wage can be adjusted to reflect differences in productivity and training costs. In real-world labor markets, this is hardly the case, because factors such as fairness considerations, union influence, unemployment insurance and minimum wages tend to compress wages relative to productivity differentials. In such a situation, employers have incentives to screen job applicants for differences in productivity/training costs and then hire those with the best score. Hence, unemployed workers who have lost some of their human capital will not get hired if the employer receives 1. Machin and Manning (1999) discuss these issues in some detail and also survey the literature. 2. Eriksson and Gottfries (2005) focus on a situation where employers discriminate against all unemployed workers, and thus do not consider the duration structure of unemployment. enough applications from more productive searchers. Thus, there might be complete discrimination against the LTU. At the same time, there are two factors that might prevent this. First, not all jobs are the same. Differences in human capital are important for some jobs, while they are much less important in other types of jobs. Second, several factors other than perceived productivity/training cost differences seem to affect the hiring process. To capture these facts in the model, it is assumed that, for a fraction of the jobs, firms prefer to hire employed or STU applicants, while for the rest of the jobs they are indifferent among all applicants. In this paper, a very stylized theoretical model with these features is set up. Firms set their wages recognizing that labor turnover is costly, as they encounter a hiring/training cost for every newly hired worker. Employed workers choose whether or not to search based on both the wages and their job satisfaction. Those who lose their jobs become STU and face a risk of becoming LTU. Searchers send in job applications to a randomly chosen firm, and firms then choose whom to hire from the pile of applications. As mentioned above, firms discriminate against the LTU for a fraction of the available jobs. The model is then solved for an equilibrium solution. 3 Owing to the complexity of the model, numerical solution methods are used. The model is calibrated with data for the German economy, and I investigate what happens, both in and out of steady state, when different parameters are changed.
The steady-state analysis shows that more ranking, a higher risk of becoming LTU, and more wage pressure all raise equilibrium unemployment, where wage pressure is a measure of the strength of the efficiency wage mechanism. The impact on unemployment is concentrated on the stock of LTU workers. It is also shown that quite modest permanent changes in the key parameters in the model will result in lengthy adjustment processes, involving substantial long-run effects on the unemployment level. For example, a permanent increase in the probability of becoming LTU (e.g. due to more rapid technological advances) results in a situation where the unemployment rate increases for many years until reaching its new steadystate value. If such slow adjustment processes are a feature of real economies, it is not surprising that economists have difficulties finding the structural causes of the rise in European unemployment.
Also, it is shown that temporary shocks have persistent effects, but the degree of persistence is quite moderate after a temporary shock to employment. A prolonged shock where many workers fall into long-term unemployment generates more persistence. Still, it is difficult to generate the extreme amount of persistence found in time-series regressions for employment. However, it should be remembered that the model abstracts from several other factors that probably also add to persistence.
The model presented here differs in a number of ways from the analysis in Blanchard and Diamond (1994) . Most importantly, both the wage-setting assumptions and the mechanism through which the duration structure of unemployment affects the wage setting differ substantially. First, the 'quasilabor supply curve' implied by Nash bargaining, with unemployment as the threat point, is replaced by an efficiency wage constraint. Second, the duration structure affects the probability that an employed searcher gets the job he applies for, inducing the firm to set a higher wage to keep costly turnover down. In the study by Blanchard and Diamond, the duration structure of unemployment affects the outside option in the wage negotiation. It is these two facts that explain the large permanent effects found in my paper. In Blanchard and Diamond's study, the threat point of the worker is affected by the fact that he runs a risk of becoming LTU himself. Unless the discount rate of the worker is very high, this will tend to keep the wage from rising in the long run. In my paper, it is optimal for the firm to raise its wage, on its initiative, following a rise in the probability of getting a job for on-thejob searchers, and this has nothing to do with the utility workers get if they become unemployed. Another difference is that, while Blanchard and Diamond assume that the person with the shortest spell is always preferred, workers in my model lose human capital stochastically at different points in time, thus adding a bit of realism.
A second related paper is that by Pissarides (1992) , who formulates a matching model with the so-called 'thin market externality'; i.e. that the supply of jobs decreases when the duration of unemployment increases, as those who have been unemployed for a long time have less human capital. In that model, an employer always hires the first unemployed worker he comes in contact with. Thus, Pissarides abstracts from the behavior of the employer in the hiring process, which is the focus in my paper. 4 A third related paper is that by Salop (1979) , who formulates an efficiency wage model where firms try to reduce turnover by offering a higher wage. However, that paper does not consider on-the-job search or distinguish between short-and long-termed unemployed workers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses empirical evidence on the employability of LTU workers. In Section 3, the theoretical model is formulated, the labor market equilibrium is derived, and some analytical results are shown. In Section 4, the model is calibrated with 4. Other related papers are those by Acemoglu (1995) and Lockwood (1991) , both of which focus on a situation where employers cannot perfectly observe the productivity of unemployed workers and therefore use statistical discrimination against them. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) try to explain the high and persistent unemployment rates from the supply side by arguing that generous welfare benefits encourage workers, who have lost human capital, to demand higher wages than employers are willing to pay.
German labor market data, and the effects of parameter changes and shocks are analyzed both in steady state and dynamically. Section 5 concludes.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EMPLOYABILITY OF LTU WORKERS
Two empirical questions are particularly relevant for the present analysis. First, does the probability of finding regular employment decline with the duration of unemployment? Second, do employers discriminate against LTU workers?
The first question is analyzed in the substantial literature on duration dependence. It is fairly clear from raw data that the exit rate from unemployment declines with the duration of unemployment for most European economies. However, the more interesting question is whether there exists so-called true duration dependence; i.e. whether the probability of leaving unemployment for a particular worker declines with the duration of his unemployment. Essentially, this boils down to trying to eliminate observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Machin and Manning (1999) review this issue in some depth. They point out that, in order to obtain identification, it is normally necessary to make assumptions about the specific functional forms of the baseline hazard function and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. 5 In fact, they conclude ( p. 3111), 'it does not really seem possible in practice to identify separately the effect of heterogeneity from that of duration dependence without making some very strong assumptions about functional form which have no foundation in any economic theory'. This, at the very least, implies that one should be very careful when interpreting results on duration dependence.
With this in mind, we may note that the results are mixed. Several studies have looked at data for the UK and Sweden. Studies of UK data normally find strong evidence of negative duration dependence, while studies using Swedish data find only weak or even positive duration dependence. Studies of data for other European countries are rarer but often do not find strong duration dependence. However, three factors may complicate the interpretation of these results. The first is exits to out-of-the-labor force. A number of studies of duration dependence do not distinguish between exits to different states, whereas others do. 6 Second, Pissarides (1992) emphasizes that as most studies are cross-sections, they use samples that do not contain very long durations. This can result in a situation where too much of the duration 5. For example, a proportional hazard function and a gamma distribution for unobserved heterogeneity. 6. Intuitively, it is natural to think that exits to out-of-the-labor force exhibit positive duration dependence; e.g. discouraged worker effects. dependence is classified as being due to heterogeneity. 7 Third, the widespread use of active labor market policy can result in breaks in unemployment spells and reclassification of workers as newly unemployed. The conclusion from the empirical studies of duration dependence seems to be that it is uncertain whether this is an important problem or not. The research so far shows that it is a problem in some countries, such as the UK, while it does not seem to be a problem in other countries like Sweden, although the extensive use of active labor market policy may explain the latter finding.
The second question, about discrimination, is usually studied using surveys or interviews where employers are asked about their hiring procedures. The idea that employers view long-term unemployment as a negative factor when making hiring decisions usually receives support, even though the size of the effects differs between studies. 8 Meager and Metcalf (1987) find that LTU workers in the UK face a high risk of being rejected by firms. Agell and Bennmarker (2002) , surveying Swedish firms, find that 62.5 per cent of the respondents stated that long unemployment spells have a negative reputation effect. 9 Klingvall (1998) , also studying Swedish firms, reports that around half of the employers in his survey state that the duration of unemployment is important when evaluating the suitability of an applicant. The stated reasons are loss of skills as well as loss of social abilities. 10 Atkinson et al. (1996) , studying UK firms, find that many firms say that a history of unemployment is a relevant selection criterion, although not the most important one. 11 cite several studies that indicate that unemployment causes demotivation and demoralization. Some studies, however, find more limited effects. Bewley (1999) finds that some of the US firms he studied view unemployment as a negative characteristic, whereas most firms view it as less important. Wood (1985) finds only weak evidence of discrimination using data for some regions in the UK.
Do LTU workers have a hard time finding work because firms believe that they have lost important skills? The existing empirical evidence is somewhat 7. One example of a study that takes account of this is that by Jackman and Layard (1991) , who, using time-series data, find strong duration dependence effects for the UK. 8. It should be noted that, as employers are unlikely to admit that they avoid hiring LTU workers, the studies mentioned probably only give a lower bound on the actual extent of this type of discrimination. 9. Other studies using Swedish data are those by Agell and Lundborg (2003) , who report that around one-fourth of the firms studied view LTU as a strong negative signal, and by Behrenz and Delander (1996) , who report that 40 per cent of firms would not choose the unemployed worker when having two otherwise similar applicants to choose from. 10. Not surprisingly, the data indicate that the fraction of employers who view the duration of unemployment as an important factor is an increasing function of duration. The function is not smooth, but rather exhibits jumps at 3-6, 9-12 and 21-24 months. 11. An interesting finding in this study is that most respondents did not support the idea that those becoming unemployed are less productive than other workers but rather that it is unemployment in itself that makes LTU workers less attractive; i.e. this study indicates that state dependence is more important than heterogeneity.
conflicting, but many studies do indicate that this is the case. Thus, it seems quite plausible that unemployment results in skill loss and a declining probability of finding a job as the duration of unemployment increases. This makes it important to investigate the consequences of such behavior theoretically.
THE MODEL
Events take place in discrete time and we may think of a period as one month long. There are a large number of workers who can be in either of three different states: employed, STU or LTU. 12 The total labor force is assumed to be constant and is normalized to one. There are a large number of identical firms in the economy, although the fixed number of firms is much smaller than the number of workers. 13 The sequence of events in the model is as follows: at the beginning of every period, an exogenous fraction, s, of the employed workers lose their jobs and fall into short-term unemployment. This fraction includes both workers quitting and workers being laid off for some exogenous reason. Firms set their wages recognizing that wages affect turnover. Turnover is costly, as firms have to pay a hiring/training cost for every newly hired worker. Those remaining employed choose whether or not to search on the job considering both the wage level offered by their present employer and the job satisfaction. An exogenous fraction, q, of the workers in short-term unemployment, including those who just became unemployed, then fall into long-term unemployment. On-the-job searchers and all unemployed workers then submit one application to a randomly chosen firm. Finally, firms choose whom to hire from the pile of applications. For a fraction, r, of the jobs, employers prefer to hire a worker who has a job or is STU, while for the rest of the vacant jobs, employers are indifferent among all applicants. Figure 1 illustrates the stocks and flows of the model. 14 There are three basic microeconomic decisions that must be made in every period: (i) the wage-setting decisions made by the firms, (ii) the decision whether or not to search made by every worker who is employed at the start of the period, and (iii) the hiring decisions made by the firms. 15 The 12. It should be noted that STU and LTU in the model are not equivalent to the definitions normally found in labor market statistics. In this model, a person who has become unemployed faces a risk of becoming LTU every period rather than automatically falling into long-term unemployment after 6 or 12 months. At the same time, the terms STU and LTU are appropriate as, on average, a person belonging to the LTU group has been unemployed a longer time and is expected to remain unemployed for a longer period of time. An alternative is to call the LTU workers 'stigmatized'. 13. The model could easily be extended to a situation with an endogenous number of firms, for example, by imposing a fixed set-up cost. 14. The notation will be introduced in the sections below. 15. The first two of these decisions are simplified versions of those analyzed in the study by Eriksson and Gottfries (2005) . following sections discuss these decisions starting with the last, and describe the equilibrium outcome of the economy.
Job applications and hiring
On-the-job searchers and both types of unemployed workers search with the same intensity. Every worker looking for a new job submits one application per period. Furthermore, the applications are sent to a randomly chosen firm. 16 As there are many more workers than firms in this economy, every firm receives a large number of applications. The crucial assumption is that a firm always receives a sufficient number of applications, so that every vacancy can be filled with the desired type of worker, within the period, from the pile of applications. Therefore, the firm has to make a decision of whom to hire. The following assumptions are made: (i) firms can observe whether the applicant is employed, STU or LTU, (ii) for a fraction (r) of the firms (jobs), the fact that LTU workers have lost skills matter, (iii) for a fraction (1 À r) of the firms (jobs), skill loss does not matter, and (iv) the division of firms (jobs) between these two types is fixed. 17 Appendix A derives the optimal hiring strategy of these firms. There, it is shown that it is optimal for the first type of firm to only hire workers who have not lost skills and for the second type to be Job-to-job mobility
Hiring
Quits / layoffs Hiring
An illustration of the stocks and flows in the model 16. This is of course a simplification of real-world behavior. However, the assumptions made have some empirical support. point out that the time spent on search is fairly limited and does not seem to diminish with the duration of unemployment in the UK. Blau and Robins (1990) show that, in a US sample, the search intensity differs little between employed and unemployed searchers. 17. It does not matter whether a fraction r of the firms uses this hiring strategy for all jobs or whether all firms use it for a fraction r of their jobs, as long as searchers submit their applications randomly.
indifferent between the two types. In this paper, such a hiring strategy is called ranking. 18
On-the-job search 19
Every worker who remains employed has to decide whether to start on-thejob search or not. It is assumed that both the wage levels and the nonpecuniary factors matter for the decision of whether or not to quit. 20 Let w t i and w t denote the wage in company i and the average wage, respectively. Each period, every employed worker draws a number v t that determines his current job dissatisfaction from a random process with cdf G(v) that is unimodal and has a mean smaller than unity. 21 The utility function of a worker is the discounted sum of expected wages divided by the expected job dissatisfactions. As the worker is back in the same position the next period regardless of whether he changes jobs, only the current period payoff affects his decision. The worker, therefore, compares the utility from continuing at his present job, given by w t i /v t i , with the expected utility from finding a new job lE[w t /v], where lo1 represents the cost of switching jobs. This means that there exists a cut-off value for n t i for which the worker is indifferent between quitting and remaining in his present job. 22 It is assumed that lE[1/v]o1; i.e. given the same wage, most workers prefer to stay in their present jobs. The fraction of workers who search on the job is given by
where S is decreasing with S 00 (1)40.
18. The important implication is that the probability of being hired is lower for LTU workers than for E/STU workers. There are obviously many ways of modeling this. One alternative would be to assume that some workers are always unproductive, but that the employers cannot distinguish them from a lot of other unemployed workers (see Eriksson, 2002) . Another alternative is to assume that it is always more costly for firms to hire LTU workers, but that sometimes they do not get enough applications from employed and/or STU workers and thus have to hire LTU workers. However, it should be noted that the aggregate implications of all these alternatives are the same: LTU workers have a hard time finding work. 19. Note that what is important is that the decision of whether or not to search on the job is a function of the relative wage. This section sketches a highly simplified micro-foundation for this assumption. 20. Akerlof et al. (1988) emphasize that non-pecuniary factors are as important as the wage levels for quit decisions. 21. The assumption that the worker makes an independent new draw every period is obviously a simplification of real-world behavior. It is motivated purely by the fact that the model, otherwise, would be very complicated to solve, as we would need to keep track of a distribution of workers with different levels of job satisfaction. However, intuitively, the results should not change if we introduce some degree of serial correlation in the job satisfaction component. 22. Note that when making this decision, the worker knows the average wage level, w t , but does not know the non-pecuniary factor associated with a new job. The cut-off value is given by v t i 5 w t i /(w t lE(1/v)). 
Wage setting
Firms are assumed to face a hiring/training cost for every worker they hire, implying that labor turnover is costly. 23 The hiring/training cost is given by a constant, c, times the average wage level, w t ; 24 the production function is given by y t F(n t i ) where y t represents a shock factor; voluntary quits are sufficiently large to accommodate all employment adjustment and firms optimize as if the world was known with certainty. 25 Let n t i denote the employment level of firm i in period t, a t the probability of finding a job for an employed/STU worker in period t, and b the discount factor. Hiring in period t is given by n i t À ð1 À sÞð1 À Sðw i t =w t Þa t Þn i tÀ1 . The maximization problem solved by the firm is then
This problem resembles a dynamic optimization problem that requires standard dynamic programming techniques to solve. However, a closer inspection shows that the only dynamic part of the problem is the fact that if the firm hires one more worker in period t, this will affect the number of workers it needs to hire in period t þ 1. As we are primarily interested in an equation for the optimal wage, we can solve the problem quite easily by simply using the first-order conditions for period t. These are equal to
Equations (3) and (4) can be used to solve for the optimal wage. The intuition behind the wage-setting mechanism is that the firm finds it optimal to raise the wage until the marginal benefit of the reduction in turnover costs is equal to the marginal cost of increasing the wage. Note that it is assumed that the same wage is set for all workers. This means that the firm cannot differentiate wages according to perceived productivity/ training cost differences among workers. There is some rigidity in the wage structure that prevents such wage differentials. Such an assumption can be justified by fairness considerations, union influence or by arguing that for 23. In practice, the prevention of excessive turnover seems to be important for real-world firms and hiring/training costs appear to be substantial; see e.g. Blinder and Choi (1990) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997) . 24. The average wage is used here to simplify the analysis. 25. It is possible to incorporate explicitly uncertainty into the model and obtain the same results. To keep the model simple, this is neglected in this paper. For details of how to model the wage setting with uncertainty, see Eriksson and Gottfries (2005) . Here, the timing of events is as follows: the wage is set, the shocks are observed and then the hiring decisions are made. some other reason there exists a 'company wage policy' that prevents wage dispersion. 26
Labor market equilibrium
Consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms set the same wage (w t i 5 w t ). This is the natural situation to analyze as all firms are assumed to be identical and, therefore, face the same wage-setting problem. To derive the aggregate equilibrium, we use the aggregate versions of the first-order conditions in equations (3) and (4). However, as a result of the recursive nature of this equation system, we need only use equation (3) to derive an expression for aggregate employment. 27 Let n t , u t S and u t L denote the aggregate levels of employment, STU and LTU, respectively. Then, aggregate employment is given by
where O 5À cS 0 (1), O being a measure of 'wage pressure' due to the efficiency wage mechanism. 28 Now a t , the probability that an employed or STU worker gets the job he applies for, has to be determined. This probability is defined as
It consists of two parts: the probability of getting a job for which ranking is used, plus the probability of getting a job for which ranking is not used. Note that the number of vacant jobs consists of new jobs and existing jobs left unfilled after both exogenous and endogenous quits. The first term consists of the fraction of jobs for which firms rank divided by the number of 26. See, for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) or Manning (1994) . 27. The aggregate versions of both of the first-order conditions in equations (3) and (4) have to hold in equilibrium. However, due to the way we have formulated the model, we do not need to use the aggregate version of equation (4) to solve for the aggregate employment level. The aggregate version of equation (3) defines a vertical curve in wage-employment space that determines aggregate employment as a function of the parameters and the employment level in the previous period. The aggregate version of equation (4) defines a negatively sloped curve that determines the aggregate wage. Labor supply issues are assumed not to affect this equilibrium; i.e. all workers prefer to work at the relevant wages. The interested reader can benefit from the discussion in Eriksson and Gottfries (2005) . 28. In the model, wage pressure arises from the fact that firms want to keep costly turnover low.
However, intuitively, this factor may also include other factors that raise the wage, like union influence. See, for example, Gottfries and Westermark (1998) for a discussion of how to model this. (6) can be solved for a t to obtain
Let us now turn to the state variables in the model. The two unemployment stocks evolve according to the following equations:
Equation (8) states that the current stock of STU workers consists of four components: the stock in the previous period plus those becoming unemployed minus those finding a job minus those who fall into long-term unemployment. Similarly, equation (9) states that the current stock of LTU workers consists of the stock in the previous period plus those who become LTU minus those who find a job. Note that a t denotes the chance of getting a job for a worker in the pool of STU and a t L denotes the corresponding chance for an LTU worker. Using equations (8) and (9) in equation (5) gives us the following expressions:
Substituting the expressions for a t and a t L into equations (10) and (11), we obtain an equation system that, in principle, can be solved for u t S and u t L . Analytically, though, this would be very complex as both a t and a t L are nonlinear functions of u t S and u t L . Further analysis of this system is therefore deferred to the numerical section below.
29. Note that if q equals one, we are back in the situation analyzed in the study by Eriksson and Gottfries (2005) ; i.e. an employer who has a bias against all unemployed workers.
Initial effects of changes in parameters
Some further understanding of the model can be gained by combining equations (5) and (7) into a dynamic employment equation:
This equation is written out explicitly in Appendix B and gives the desired aggregate employment in the current period as a function of employment and short-term unemployment in the previous period. Consider for a moment the intuition behind equation (12). Employment dynamics arise because the optimal wage depends positively on the probability of getting a job for an employed searcher. Therefore, it is obvious that the employment level of the previous period matters. The division of unemployment between short-and long-term unemployment also matters because if a larger fraction of the unemployed workers are in the LTU pool, this results in a higher probability of getting a job for on-the-job searchers. This induces firms to raise the wage even more to retain their employees and, in equilibrium, employment falls. 30 Expression (12) cannot be solved for steady-state employment as it contains two state variables but it is possible to ask, for a given number of employed/unemployed workers in the previous period, what the effects of changes in the parameters on employment are. Clearly, this gives us only the initial effects, but it does provide some useful intuition.
First, one might be interested in the effect of ranking on the current employment level. In Appendix B, it is shown that
In other words, if a larger fraction of the vacant jobs is reserved for employed and STU applicants, we obtain a lower aggregate employment level. If more jobs are reserved for the privileged group, this will tend to increase the probability of finding jobs for employed workers. To prevent costly turnover, firms will then raise their wages, leading to lower employment. Second, consider the effects from faster skill loss among the unemployed, which, in this model, is captured by an increase in q. In Appendix B, it is shown that
In other words, if the probability that an unemployed worker falls from shortto long-term unemployment increases, this will tend to decrease aggregate 30. Note that an individual firm perceives this probability as exogenous. The only way for a firm to reduce turnover is by raising the wage to discourage search among its employees. As all firms are identical, all firms have the same incentive, all wages rise and employment falls. employment. This result holds only if some firms rank job applicants, as the division of workers between STU and LTU would otherwise be irrelevant. The intuition is that if q increases, this implies a reduction in the pool of privileged jobseekers. This increases the probability of finding a job for employed workers, resulting in higher wages and, in equilibrium, lower employment.
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In order to gain some further understanding of the model, it is useful to set numerical values for the different parameters. This makes it possible to solve the model for the steady-state values of employment, STU and LTU, and look at how these variables are affected by parameter changes. In addition, it allows us to study the dynamic adjustment process following both permanent and temporary shocks. Choosing reasonable values for the parameters, we can obtain a sense of how large the effects are and how long the adjustment takes.
Calibration
In a steady state, the model contains the following five parameters: (i) the fraction of workers who leave employment for unemployment every period, s, (ii) the fraction searching on the job, S, (iii) the amount of wage pressure, O, (iv) the fraction of jobs for which firms use ranking, r, and (v) the risk that an STU worker faces of becoming LTU, q. Although estimates of several of these key parameters do not exist, it turns out that it is possible to use other facts about the labor market to deduce the values that the parameters have to take for the steady-state solution to be consistent with these facts. To implement this strategy, it must be decided which facts the model should be fitted against. What is needed is at least as many facts as unknown parameters, and preferably some more to check the model against. Table 1 presents values for the German economy (all steady-state values). 31 Essentially, these facts are of two types: data on labor market stocks and flows and data on the probability of finding a job for an unemployed worker for different durations of unemployment. 32 The relevant time period in all calibrations is one month and all data for labor market flows are monthly figures. The details of the data are presented in Appendix C.
To be able to calibrate the model, we need an explicit definition of a steady state. It is natural to define it as a situation where all stocks remain constant. 31 . In view of the purpose of this paper, it is natural to choose a typical continental European economy. 32. It should be noted that the probability of remaining unemployed at different durations of unemployment depends on a, a L and q, as can be seen in equation (D.3). Thus, we can obtain negative duration dependence even when q is constant.
In the context of this model, this means that the numbers of employed, STU, and LTU are kept constant. Note that it is sufficient to write conditions that ensure that two of the stocks are kept unchanged to know that all three stocks remain constant. Therefore, these conditions can be written in the form most beneficial to solving the model. First, to ensure that employment is kept constant, it is assumed that equation (5) satisfies
Furthermore, to keep the two stocks of unemployed workers constant, it is sufficient that the flows in and out of STU remain equal. This requirement can be written as
The facts reported with boldface numbers in Table 1 are used to calculate the values of the parameters identified above. The facts in the rest of the rows are then used as a check of the model. Equations linking the facts in Table 1 to the theoretical model and the details of the calibration are presented in Appendices D and E, respectively. This exercise yields the values summarized in Table 2 . It should be noted that all results are robust to reasonable changes in the magnitudes in Table 1 . 33 Looking at the parameter values in Table 2 , it should be noted that none of them seems unreasonable. As empirical estimates for several of them do not exist, it is difficult to judge the accuracy of these values, but the reader should note that the exact numbers are not important for the analysis. Generally, what are interesting are the signs and rough magnitudes of the effects. For example, the calibration implies that employed and STU workers have around a two and a half times higher probability of finding a job than those who are LTU.
Steady-state analysis
Using the parameter values in Table 2 , it is possible to investigate the steadystate effects of parameter changes. Table 3 shows the effects of changing one parameter at a time by 20 per cent of its initial value. Now consider these results in detail. First, if the degree of ranking in the economy increases, we see that this results in substantial increases in long-term unemployment and total unemployment, while short-term unemployment remains essentially unchanged. The result that total unemployment increases is expected from the previous discussion. More ranking implies a higher long-term unemployment for two reasons. First, for a given number of jobs, more ranking implies a higher long-term unemployment as these workers face a decreased chance of finding a job; fewer vacancies are open to them. Second, more ranking has a negative effect on the total number of jobs in the economy and this also implies a higher long-term unemployment. Moreover, these two factors have opposite effects on the stock of shortterm unemployment and roughly seem to cancel each other out. Second, if the probability of becoming LTU for an unemployed worker increases, we see that short-term unemployment decreases while long-term and total unemployment increase. As was discussed in the previous section, higher q leads to an increased chance of getting a job for on-the-job searchers, upward pressure on wages and lower aggregate employment. Turning to the STU, it should be noted that there are two opposing effects at work here. First, a higher q means an increased outflow from the STU, which tends to decrease this stock. Second, a higher q means fewer jobs in the economy, something that implies higher STU. Using the calculated values, it seems that the first effect dominates; a higher q tends to reduce short-term unemployment. Long-term unemployment, on the other hand, increases due to both of the mentioned effects.
Third, if the degree of wage pressure increases, all unemployment stocks increase. It should be noted that the numerical analysis indicates a difference between the effects of wage pressure and the degree of ranking in the economy. More ranking implies that the whole increase in unemployment is concentrated to long-term unemployment. More wage pressure, on the other hand, results in increases in both short-and long-term unemployment, even though the effect on long-term unemployment is stronger.
Fourth, an increase in the flow from employment to unemployment implies an increase in all unemployment stocks. The reason is that a higher s implies more job vacancies, increased opportunities for on-the-job searchers, upward pressure on wages and lower employment. It is natural that both stocks of unemployed workers increase as nothing really changes in the relation between short-and long-term unemployment.
Fifth, an increase in the number of on-the-job searchers implies less longterm and total unemployment and essentially no change in short-term unemployment. More on-the-job searchers imply an increase in the number of searchers, something that induces firms to reduce wages and employ more workers. Again, this does not really affect the relative position of those who are STU or LTU.
Finally, it is interesting to look a little bit at how O, r and q interact. The last three rows in Table 3 show that the effects of parameter changes are reinforced when we increase another parameter. This can be seen by noting that the unemployment rate increases by more than the sum of the individual effects. In other words, if skill loss and ranking are widespread in Skill Loss, Ranking of Job Applicants and the Dynamics of Unemployment r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 an economy, this reinforces the negative employment effects of increased wage pressure etc. too.
Before leaving the steady-state discussion, it is worthwhile to look briefly at differences in the effects of the various factors that might generate both persistence and long-run effects: wage pressure, ranking and skill loss. Intuitively, the different effects of these three factors can be understood by thinking in terms of survivor functions, where surviving means remaining unemployed after different durations of unemployment. This is illustrated in Figure 2 .
In Figure 2 , the solid curve shows the survivor function with the calibrated parameter values. The other two curves show what happens when either ranking or wage pressure is changed, keeping all other parameters constant. Here, the differences between changing the amount of ranking and changing the amount of wage pressure are apparent. More wage pressure shifts the whole curve upwards, implying that the probability of getting a job declines at all durations. More ranking, on the other hand, harms those with long durations of unemployment the most. 34
Period Fraction remaining unemployed
Wage pressure Ranking/skill loss Base case Figure 2 An illustration of the different effects of r, q and O 34. This also helps us understand the numbers falling out of the calibration. The model is essentially calibrated using such a curve as an input, and the curve used implies that the probability of leaving unemployment declines with duration. As O cannot generate such an outcome, r40 and q40 are needed.
Dynamic adjustment to permanent shocks
A natural starting point for a dynamic analysis is to analyze what the adjustment path looks like after a permanent change in one or more of the parameters. As the inflow rate into unemployment seems to have remained virtually unchanged, this means that we have three factors that potentially could have caused rising unemployment: skill loss, ranking and wage pressure. 35 The first two may result from more rapid technological advances or changes in the organization of firms that increase the skill requirements of individual workers. The latter one may change as the result of increased training costs, more focus on keeping turnover down or increased union strength. 36 Let us start by investigating the effects of a permanent increase in the risk of becoming LTU for an STU worker (q). This is illustrated in Figure 3 . Recall the discussion above where it was shown that an increase in q leads to lower short-term unemployment and higher long-term unemployment, with the net effect on unemployment being positive. In Figure 3 , it is clear that these effects are present, but we also see that the timing of the effects differs Evidence that s has remained essentially unchanged can be found in the study by . It is of course also possible that the extent of on-the-job search has increased. 36. Remember that the effects of increased union strength intuitively are identical to an increase in O. markedly. 37 The decrease in short-term unemployment seems to occur during the first few periods, while the increase in long-term unemployment is drawn out over a very long period of time. The implication for an economy, which for some reason undergoes an increase in the risk of becoming LTU, is a steady increase in unemployment for years to come. These effects eventually die out, but the analysis indicates that it takes a very long time. The effect might be even more severe if the economy suffers several increases in the long-term unemployment risk due to technological advances that increase the mismatch in the labor market. Turning now to the effects of an increase in the degree of ranking, one might expect the outcome to be similar; a substantial increase in long-term unemployment and smaller effects on short-term unemployment. Figure 4 shows the adjustment after an increase of r from 50 to 75 per cent. Figure 4 shows that the effects from more ranking actually are similar to those in Figure 3 . The intuition behind this result is that r and q in some sense are substitutes; more discrimination against the LTU with the same inflow or a Figure 4 The effects of a 50 per cent increase in r 37. It is interesting to look at the effects of an increase in q on the number of workers who have been unemployed for less than one year. Using equation (D.2) gives us u o12 months 5 0.033; i.e. a slight increase. Remember that those workers, in the model, can be both STU and LTU, even though most are STU. An increase in q has three effects: the advantage to be STU increases, more workers fall into long-term unemployment and fewer jobs are available.
larger inflow and the same amount of discrimination are somewhat similar in their effects. However, two differences are worth noting. 38 First, if r increases, this results in a nearly unchanged short-term unemployment whereas an increase in q leads to a decrease in short-term unemployment. Second, the effect on long-term unemployment appears to be much stronger from ranking. Finally, let us turn to the consequences of an increase in the degree of wage pressure. Figure 5 shows what happens after such a change. Recall the steadystate analysis where it was shown that more wage pressure results in an increase in both stocks of unemployed workers. This result is confirmed in Figure 5 . 39 However, note that the STU increase occurs during the first year, whereas the LTU increase is much more substantial and drawn out. Figure 5 The effects of a 50 per cent increase in O 38. Another difference is the consequences for the number of workers who have been unemployed for less than one year. Here, we obtain u o12 months 5 0.030; i.e. a slight decrease. Remember that this stock contains both STU and LTU workers. More ranking has three effects: the advantage to be STU increases, the disadvantage to be LTU increases and there are fewer jobs in the economy. 39. The consequence for the number of workers who have been unemployed for less than a year is now a substantial increase; u o12 months 5 0.037. More wage pressure results in fewer jobs in the economy. Over time, though, the effect becomes concentrated to the stock of workers who have been unemployed for one year or more.
Skill Loss, Ranking of Job Applicants and the Dynamics of Unemployment r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 To summarize these experiments, it is obvious that the mechanisms analyzed in this paper can have strong effects on the unemployment level. Quite moderate changes in the parameters can lead to a prolonged period of adjustment to a new equilibrium that entails a substantial change in the unemployment level. It should also be noted that it is quite possible that realworld labor markets have suffered permanent shocks that are a combination of the three types analyzed in this section.
An interesting question is whether these experiments can help us to understand the rise in European unemployment. 40 During the last decades, both short-and long-term unemployment have increased, even though the increase has been particularly big in long-term unemployment. This means that the relative incidence of long-term unemployment has increased substantially over time. 41 From Figures 3 and 4 , it is clear that ranking and skill loss alone cannot explain what has happened since both short-and longterm unemployment have increased. From Figure 5 , we see that wage pressure affects both short-and long-term unemployment. However, it is impossible to distinguish between different combinations of factors in a purely theoretical analysis. What is needed to analyze this important question fully is data about the evolution over time of the probability of finding a job at different durations, and such data are not readily available. Further empirical research is clearly needed to distinguish between hypotheses.
Temporary shocks
We may also analyze what the dynamic adjustment path looks like after a temporary shock. Let us start by stating the difference equations that determine the stocks of short-and long-term unemployment, respectively. Linearizing these equations and evaluating them in steady state yields the following two expressions:
Consider first an increase in short-term unemployment by 1 per cent. According to these equations, this implies an increase in short-term unemployment the next period by 0.84 per cent as well as an increase in long-term unemployment the next period by 0.05 per cent. The intuition is that firms are reluctant to cut wages, as this would lead to costly turnover. Hence, the employment level returns only slowly to equilibrium following a 40. It should be noted that short-and long-term unemployment in the model are not identical to short-and long-term unemployment in the data (see the discussion in Section 3). 41. For example, in Germany the incidence of long-term unemployment increased from around 30 per cent in 1979 to almost 50 per cent in the mid-1980s (OECD, 1993 shock. If long-term unemployment is 1 per cent higher, this implies an increase in long-term unemployment in the next period by more than 0.96 per cent, but has a small effect on short-term unemployment in the next period. The explanation is the slow employment adjustment effect combined with the limited number of jobs open to LTU workers. Now let us look more closely at the adjustment back to equilibrium following a shock to unemployment. As a first experiment, let us study the effects of a temporary increase in the flow from employment to unemployment, s. 42 This experiment can be motivated by the fact that a recession seems to be a fairly short period of high job destruction, and the model equivalent of this is an increase in s. To be concrete, let us assume that s doubles for six periods and then returns to its original level. Figure 6 shows how the two stocks of unemployed workers are affected by such a shock. Figure 6 reveals several interesting facts. First, short-term unemployment increases during the period with a large inflow, but then returns fairly quickly to its steady-state value. This is hardly surprising as employers perceive these workers to be equivalent to their present employees in all jobs. Meanwhile, long-term unemployment initially increases slowly, but instead continues to increase several periods after the shock, and then only very slowly adjusts back to its steady-state value. This is the result of two forces; a bigger stock of STU workers implies a larger inflow into long-term unemployment for a number of periods and, in addition, employers to a large extent refuse to hire LTU workers, as they are perceived as more costly to hire than other applicants. Total unemployment falls during the whole period after the shock, but due to the lengthy adjustment path of long-term unemployment it takes some time for total unemployment to return to its pre-shock value; i.e. unemployment shows persistence (after 12 months, around 40 per cent of the shock remains). One might expect more persistent effects from a shock that lasts longer as, in such a situation, more workers would fall into LTU. Figure 7 shows what happens if the economy suffers a shock lasting two years. As the shock lasts longer, more workers fall into LTU and this results in a more drawn-out adjustment back to equilibrium than in the previous experiment (after 12 months around 50 per cent of the shock remains). Similar results are obtained if we let the shock last for six months, as in Figure 6 , but also let the risk of becoming LTU be twice as large. This would correspond to a shock that involves more job destruction as well as an increased mismatch in the labor market. Such a shock results in dynamics mainly involving LTU and, as expected, the outcome is a more drawn-out adjustment process. The conclusion from this section is that the model implies persistence, but that the degree of persistence depends on the nature of the shock. A shock that involves a larger inflow into unemployment for only a short period results in some persistence. A more prolonged shock to this inflow, or a short shock that affects both the inflow and the probability of becoming LTU, results in more persistence. Essentially, the key to attaining a substantial amount of persistence is that the shock implies a substantial increase in longterm unemployment and not just short-term unemployment. Depending on the duration and type of shock, the model generates yearly persistence rates of 40-60 per cent. It should be noted, though, that the model cannot generate the near unit-root persistence found in empirical studies of unemployment time series. 43 At the same time, it should be remembered that the model abstracts from several factors that probably also add to persistence such as wage contracts spanning several periods and overlapping wage contracts.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the consequences of skill loss as a result of unemployment. Unemployed workers risk losing some of their human capital so there are two groups of unemployed workers: those who have lost some (LTU) and those who have not (STU). Firms that are unable to differentiate wages according to productivity/training cost differences sometimes avoid hiring workers who have lost human capital. To prevent costly turnover, firms set a wage above the market-clearing wage. This paper then analyzes how such an economy responds to both temporary and permanent shocks.
It is shown that both an increased risk of losing human capital, an increased degree of ranking or more wage pressure result in higher steadystate unemployment, with the effects being concentrated on the stock of LTU workers. Moreover, the negative employment effects of both skill loss and wage pressure increase when combined with ranking. It is also shown that permanent changes in these key factors generate lengthy adjustment phases involving substantial effects on the employment level. The numerical analysis indicates that it takes several years for the economy to reach the new steady-state level, even when the parameter change is quite moderate.
Also, temporary shocks have persistent effects on employment. The amount of persistence depends on the type and duration of the shock, but the model is not capable of producing the near unit-root serial correlation found in empirical studies. It should be remembered, though, that we are abstracting from several factors that might add persistence such as wage contracts that span several periods and overlapping contracts. Another way to achieve more persistence is to allow for discrimination against all unemployed workers, as in the study by Eriksson and Gottfries (2005) . 43 . Empirical estimates of the serial correlation of unemployment series for Germany often find persistence around 90 per cent (see, for example, Blanchard and Summers, 1986) . What conclusions can be drawn from this study about the high and persistent European unemployment rates? The main contribution of this paper is the demonstration that if turnover considerations, skill loss as a result of unemployment and inability to differentiate wages are important features of real-world economies, this will affect how the economies respond to both permanent and temporary shocks, resulting in lengthy adjustment phases involving substantial effects on the unemployment rates.
APPENDIX A. THE OPTIMAL HIRING STRATEGY OF FIRMS
Suppose that what are lost during unemployment are social skills, and that a worker can regain the social skills he has lost by working one period. Also, suppose that there are two types of firms (jobs) in the economy: one type where social skills are very important for production and one type where social skills are unimportant. The division of firms (jobs) between these two types is fixed, so that a fraction r of the firms (jobs) is of the first type and a fraction (1 À r) of the firms (jobs) is of the second type. Job applicants do not know the type of a particular firm (job) but apply randomly. Also, there is some rigidity in the wage structure that prevents wage differentiation based on productivity. Let us now consider the optimal hiring strategy.
Jobs where social skills matter
Let the marginal productivity ( possibly net of training costs) of the last hired worker be D if the applicant has not lost skills, and D L if the applicant has lost skills, where D4D L . Denote the profit stream from hiring an applicant who has not lost skills p and the profit stream from hiring an applicant who has lost skills p L . Also, suppose that a worker who quits is always replaced with a worker who has not lost skills (nothing changes if this assumption is dropped). If all periods are identical, the wage is w j for all workers, the hiring cost is cw for all workers, a fraction S of all employed workers search on the job, the probability that an employed searcher gets a job is a and the discount factor is b, then the profits from hiring a marginal worker are given by
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APPENDIX C: DATA
The model is calibrated with German labor market data from the mid-1980s. This appendix discusses some conceptual issues and presents the sources of the data. In real-world labor markets, there exist at least three distinct states: employed (E), one or more groups of unemployed (U), and out-of-the-labor force (OLF). In this paper, the last group is left out to keep the model manageable and to focus attention on the central mechanisms. However, this adds a slight complication to the calibration as there are considerable flows among all three states (see e.g. Burda and Wyplosz, 1994) . For example, it may be argued that if OLF is excluded, the flows between E and U should be adjusted upwards to take account of the fact that some workers leaving the workforce are replaced by new workers entering unemployment and competing for jobs with unemployed workers (this effect may, however, be counteracted by workers leaving U and entering OLF). Moreover, people also flow directly from OLF to E, implying that some of those classified as OLF do compete for jobs and thus should be included in the U stock. These issues are considered in a sensitivity analysis to the calibration (see footnote 33). The exclusion of OLF dynamics can also be justified by arguing that the net flows to and from the labor force vary less than other flows over the business cycle (Blanchard and Diamond, 1990) .
The following data are used in the calibration:
Fraction of employed workers entering unemployment (s): Layard et al.
(1991), using OECD data, report a monthly inflow rate of 0.4 per cent of employment. This figure is obtained by taking the number of unemployed workers with a duration of less than one month. This excludes roughly half of those whose completed spell is less than one month. To take account of this fact, the slightly higher value 0.5 per cent is used in the calibration. Fraction of employed job-to-job switchers (x E ! E ): Here, two possible sources of data have been found. Burda and Wyplosz (1994) report that, in 1987, 0.3 per cent of those employed jump from job to job, while Boeri (1999) reports that the figure in 1992 is 0.7 per cent. Here, we assume that half of those hired are employed and use the figure 0.5 per cent in the calibration. Unemployment (u): Layard et al. (1991) report unemployment rates from OECD sources. The average unemployment rate for the period 1985-87 is 6.6 per cent. Unemployed less than one year (u o12 months ): OECD (1993) reports that in 1986 around 49 per cent of those being unemployed had been so for 12 months or more. Probability of remaining unemployed after 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months ( y z ): Hunt (1995) reports data from the public-use version of the householdbased GSOEP. Using data for the time period 1983-88, she calculates Kaplan-Meier survival curves. From these figures, it is clear that 90, 70, 54, 44 and 36 per cent remain unemployed after 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months, respectively. The figures are obtained by calculating escapes only to employment, while keeping escapes to OLF recorded as censored. As the model does not contain OLF dynamics, it is that figure that is relevant here. The outflow rate from unemployment (x U ! E ): OECD (1993) reports estimates of 7.6 per cent monthly for the year 1989. It should be remembered, though, that this figure includes all flows from unemployment and therefore should be used with caution. Fraction searching on-the-job (S): , who report data for the UK from the Labour Force Study, say that around 5 per cent of those being employed engage in on-the-job search. As this is the only estimate available, it at least gives a rough guide as to what value can be considered reasonable.
APPENDIX D. DEFINITIONS
The following equations provide links between the labor market facts in Table  1 and the theoretical model.
The fraction of employed workers switching jobs, x E ! E , is given by The number of workers who at any given time have been unemployed for less than one year is given by
ð1 À qÞ i ð1 À aÞ i þ snq X 11 k¼0 X k i¼0 ð1 À qÞ i ð1 À aÞ i ð1 À a L Þ ðkþ1ÞÀi ( )
ðD:2Þ
The probability of remaining unemployed after z months of unemployment, y z , is given by y z ¼ ð1 À qÞ z ð1 À aÞ z þ q X zÀ1 k¼0 ð1 À qÞ k ð1 À aÞ k ð1 À a L Þ zÀk ðD:3Þ
The outflow rate from unemployment, x U ! E , can be derived from the fact that the outflow from unemployment must be equal to the inflow into unemployment. It is given by
with the observable magnitudes s; n; x E!E ; y 1 month ; y 12 months È É set equal to their steady-state values given in Table 1 .
Essentially, the equation system (E.1)-(E.6) could be solved directly. However, due to the complexity of this system, an iterative method is used. The algorithm used can be described by the following four steps: a value is set for the variable q; the system (E.1)-(E.5) is solved for {O, S, r, a, u S }; the value of equation (E.6) is calculated; and a new value of q is chosen until convergence is achieved, i.e. equation (E.6) is satisfied.
